Predatory Pricing in the Canadian Context by Beitel, Kara
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 
Volume 12 Article 7 
1-1-2003 
Predatory Pricing in the Canadian Context 
Kara Beitel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 3.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Kara Beitel, "Predatory Pricing in the Canadian Context" (2003) 12 Dal J Leg Stud 203. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For 
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
PREDATORY PRICING ... 203 
PREDATORY PRICING IN THE CANADIAN CONTEXT 
KARA BEITEd 
ABSTRACT 
Predat01y pricing is one of the most debated aspects of antitrust legisla-
tion and theory. Economic scholars dispute its existence, and the meth-
ods for its detection are the subject of ongoing debate. Consequently, 
the regulation of this type of anticompetitive behaviour has developed 
sign?ficantly over the past thirty years. The cases and Guidelines reveal 
a care.fit! approach taken to behaviour as predation. The 
need to ensure that legitimate forms of competition are not penalized is 
integral to the success oft he Competition Act and to the attainment o.f its 
enumerated purposes. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust legislation requires the cooperation of economic theory and 
legal discourse. Nowhere is this more apparent than with respect to 
predatory pricing. Debate and discussion regarding the proper legal 
stance on this issue has gone on for decades, with academics and 
economists arguing amongst each other through their various publica-
tions. The underlying question is whether predatory pricing should be 
the subject of regulation. Opponents to its presence in antitrust legisla-
tion argue that, if it exists at all, it is so rare and difficult to detect that 
any attempts would be fruitless. Worse, they contend that an attempt to 
regulate would actually harm competition. Legitimate and desirable 
forms of competition would be identified as predatory behaviour and 
subsequently punished. Proponents of predatory pricing provisions ar-
t Kara Beitel is currently in her final year of the combined LL.B/MPA program. Prior to her 
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gue that, although rare, predation can and does occur in the market 
place. In order to protect healthy competition, rogue firms engaged in 
the practice must be identified and others dissuaded from attempting 
such a strategy. 
Based on these economic debates, Canadian legislators have identi-
fied predation as a practice requiring regulation. The difficulty rests in 
finding a definition which captures predatory behaviour, while recog-
nizing legitimate competition for what it is. The discussion that follows 
will focus on how antitrust regulators and the comis have defined 
predation, and how effective these Canadian regulations have been to 
date. A reflection of the caselaw and the Competition Bureau's Guide-
lines will reveal a reluctance to label price-cutting as predato1y, except 
in the most obvious of cases. This caution shows a respect for the 
purposes underlying the Competition Act, and a desire to prevent gov-
ernment regulation from having the very opposite effects of those 
intended. 
II. PURPOSES OF THE COMPETITION ACT 
The purposes of the Competition Act are set out in s. 1 of the statute: 
The purpose of this Act is to maintain and encourage competition in 
Canada in order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the 
Canadian economy, in order to expand opportunities for Canadian 
participation in world markets while at the same time recognizing the 
role offoreign competition in Canada, in order to ensure that small and 
medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate 
in the Canadian economy and in order to provide consumers with 
competitive prices and product choices. 1 
Of these four main purposes, the final one is often considered the most 
important. It is also the purpose which underlies the regulation of 
predatory pricing. 
' Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 19 (2nd Supp.), s. l. 
PREDATORY PRICING ... 205 
III. DEFINITION OF CLASSIC AND STRATEGIC PREDATION 
For the purposes of this discussion and the analysis contained herein, the 
definition of classic predation adopted by the Canadian Competition 
Bureau will be used as a starting point. The Predatory Pricing Guide-
lines define the practice as "a situation where a dominant firm charges 
low prices over a long enough period of time so as to drive a competitor 
from the market or deter others from entering and then raises prices to 
recoup its losses."2 Central to this definition is firm dominance in the 
market and the potential for future recoupment of losses.3 
The following analysis will deal almost exclusively with classic 
predation. Strategic predation has yet to find a prominent place in 
Canadian law and jurisprudence, and for those reasons is outside the 
parameters of this discussion. It should be remembered, however, that 
the adoption of amended Guidelines for Illegal Trade Practices, dis-
cussed in more detail below, may make strategic predation a relevant 
topic for future examination. 
IV. ECONOMIC THEORY UNDERLYING PREDATORY PRICING 
While there is insufficient space to do justice to the economic theories 
surrounding the phenomenon of predatory pricing, a brief overview will 
be useful to contextualize the later discussion. The two leading disci-
plines of economic theory, referred to as the Chicago and Harvard 
2 J. A. VanDuzer and G. Paquet (Industry Canada-Competition Bureau), Anticompetitive 
Pricing Practices and the Competition Act: TheoJJ' Law and Practice (Ottawa: Minister of 
Public Works and Government Services, 1999) at 9 [VanDuzer & Paquet]. 
3 Strategic predation, as defined in academic literature, is intended to deter potential entrants in 
a market, to discipline established rivals in the market, or perhaps simply to gain a reputation 
for the predator. If a dominant firm establishes a reputation of incurring significant losses in 
order to drive down the value or hurt its rivals, those rivals may become more timid in their 
future pricing strategies. In this scenario, future recoupment of losses through the imposition 
of monopoly-level prices is less important. The predator's goal is to ensure their continued 
dominance of the market, and to prevent to future erosion of profits. See Richard A. Posner, 
"The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis" (1979) 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 at 932 [Posner, 
"Chicago School"]. 
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Schools, disagree on whether predatory pricing exists as a real practice 
in the market place. 
The Chicago School approaches antitrust economic analysis accord-
ing to its traditional "laissez-faire" stance, and argues that predatory 
pricing is not a viable or rational business strategy and for this reason 
will seldom, if ever, occur. To regulate and enforce prohibitions on the 
practice would have the negative effect of capturing price cuts which are 
pro-competitive and which generally benefit consumers. These conclu-
sions are based largely on basic economic theories of supply and de-
mand, and their relationship to price changes. Robert Bork is particu-
larly apt at using this relationship to demonstrate that, should a domi-
nant firm engage in predatory price-cutting, it will suffer from greater 
losses than its intended victim, and it will be unable to later recoup these 
losses.4 Because firms are generally believed to be profit-maximizing, 
the inability to recoup losses will dissuade the rational firm from engag-
ing in predation.5 
The Harvard School is far more likely to see predation as a real 
threat to healthy competition. Their economic analysis, which has pre-
sented a direct challenge to that of Chicagoans, argues that despite its 
rare occurrence, predation should be a concern for antitrust regulators. 
The debate between advocates of the Harvard School, ignited by the 
seminal miicle by Areeda and Turner,6 has centred largely on the proper 
method of identification. As will become clear throughout the discus-
sion that follows, this is a debate which continues to this day. Areeda 
and Turner support a definition which identifies pricing as predatory 
when it falls below marginal cost. At this level, the firm is selling their 
product at a loss, and is wasting social resources, given that the cost of 
production exceeds the value of the finished product. Most importantly, 
however, pricing below marginal cost "greatly increases the possibility 
that rivalry will be extinguished or prevented for reasons unrelated to 
4 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itse(f, (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1978) at 145-153 [Bork]; for a more complete analysis of the Chicagoan position 
on predatory pricing see Donald G. Mcfetridge, "Predatory and Discriminatory Pricing" in 
Frank Mathewson, Michael Trebilcock & Michael Walker eds., The Law and Economics of 
Competition Policy (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute 1990) 71 [Mcfetridge] and Frank H. 
Easterbrook, "Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies" (1981) 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263. 
5 Posner, "Chicago School", supra note 3 at 928. 
6 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, "Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act" (1975) 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, [Areeda & Turner, "Predatory Pricing"]. 
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the efficiency of the monopolist."7 Another prominent economist has 
suggested that this definition is too narrow to capture all predatory 
behaviour. Douglas Greer advocates a more inclusive definition of 
predatory pricing. 8 According to this standard, any price below average 
total cost should be looked at with suspicion: 
!fa firm's price falls below average total cost ... the firm may continue 
to produce and sell in the short run if price is above its average variable 
cost, but in the long run, a price below average total cost will cause the 
firm to go out of business ... a predator could succeed in driving 
equally efficient rivals from the field yet escape detection under the 
Areeda-Turner rule ... 9 
An additional requisite element under Greer's approach is a predatory 
intent. This requirement distinguishes cases such as that described 
above from situations in which a firm may be selling below average total 
costs due to legitimate business considerations. 10 This requirement will 
be discussed in more detail throughout the discussion of predatory 
pricing regulation in Canada. 
1. Summary of the Economic Rationale 
Despite inspiring a plethora of debate and discussion on the issue, 
Areeda and Turner did not directly respond to the criticisms put forward 
by Bork and other Chicagoans. Is there any reason to create a workable 
definition of predatory pricing? Does it, or could it, exist in the market 
place? A recent paper commissioned by the Canadian Competition 
Bureau, provides a useful summary of the arguments supporting the 
existence of predatory pricing within the market place, thus justifying its 
prohibition. The paper noted that many economists and academics who 
support some sort of prohibition of predation base their arguments on: 
models which acknowledge that information and capital markets are 
not perfectly efficient. The predator and the victim will not have 
7 Ibid. at 712. 
8 Douglas F. Greer, "A Critique of Areeda and Turner's Standard for Predatory Practices" 
( 1979) 24 Antitrust Bull. 233 at 234-35 [Greer, "Critique"]. 
9 Ibid at 240. 
10 Greer, "Critique", supra note 8 at 235. 
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complete information regarding each other and the victim may not 
have access to sufficient capital to survive the period of predation. 11 
This implies that some of the assumptions which are central to the 
arguments presented by Chicagoans may be incorrect. The importance 
of these two factors, full access to information and financial markets, to 
a rational theory of predatory pricing is emphasized by Mcfetridge, who 
stated that "In the absence of financial asymmetries (deep pockets), full 
knowledge is fatal to classical predation." 12 In the absence of these 
assumptions about the market, the argument that predation is always an 
irrational strategy cannot be sustained. 13 
V. APPLICATION OF CANADIAN PREDATORY PRICING LAWS 
1. THE PREDATORY PRICING TRILOGY 
The Canadian jurisprudence concerning predatory pricing is limited to 
three cases which were brought under s. 33A(l )( c) of the Combines 
Investigations Act (later renumbered as s. 34(1)(c)). This provision is 
identical to that found today in paragraph 50(1 )( c) of the Competition 
Act. 14 Each of these cases will be considered, especially with respect to 
the court's view of which practices constitute predatory behaviour 
versus those which are seen as healthy competition. 
11 VanDuzer & Paquet, supra note 2 at 9 . 
12 McFetridge, supra note 4 at 77. 
13 This conclusion is based on the academic assessment of classic predation. The presence of 
strategic considerations, which are largely outside the scope of this paper, further support the 
conclusion that predation is a rational business strategy. 
14 Section 50 of the Competition Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s. 50; l 999, c. 31, s. 50(F).) states: 
50. ( l) Every one engaged in a business who 
(c) engages in a policy of selling products at prices unreasonably 
low, having the effect or tendency of substantially lessening compe-
tition or eliminating a competitor, or designed to have that effect, is 
guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding two years. 
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i. R. v. The Producers Dairy Ltd. 
The first case of predation was brought in the mid-1960s, and concerned 
the competition practices within the Ottawa dairy industry. R. v. The 
Producers Dairy Ltd. 15 was brought in response to a significant decrease 
in the wholesale price at which Producers sold their product to retail 
stores. The case considered what constituted a "policy" of selling pursu-
ant to the Combines Investigations Act. The Court of Appeal described 
the meaning of the provision by stating that it required "something more 
than ... the adoption of a temporary expedient to meet an aggressive, 
competitive move aimed directly at an important customer .... " 16 
Prior to this prosecution, similar allegations against one of Produc-
ers' competitors had been dismissed after the Commission distinguished 
their actions from those of Producers as being "purely defensive and 
self-protecting." 17 The Court of Appeal ultimately dismissed the case 
against Producers for the same reasons. This is the first indication that 
the courts would consider whether the challenged price-cut was aggres-
sive or defensive as relevant to finding the defendant guilty of predation. 
ii. R. v. Hoffinann-La Roche Ltd 
The second case, R. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, 18 was brought in 
response to Hoffman-La Roche offering free valium tablets to hospitals 
for two six-month periods when faced with a new entrant to the market. 
The case is significant as it is the first conviction under the predatory 
pricing provisions, and because it provides a full analysis of the ele-
ments of the offence. 19 The comi identified these elements as: being 
engaged in a business; being engaged in a policy of selling articles; 
unreasonably low prices; and an anticompetitive effect of the policy or 
an anticompetitive mens rea.20 Although there was contention regarding 
15 (1966), 50 C.P.R. (2d) 265 (Ont. C.A.) [Producers Daily]. 
16 Ibid. at 271. 
17 Donald G. Mcfetridge & Stanley Wong, "Predatory Pricing In Canada: The Law and the 
Economics" (1985) 63 Can. Bar Rev. 685 at 689 [Mcfetridge & Wong, "Predatory Pricing"]. 
18 (1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 5 (Ont. H.C.J.) [Hoffinan-La Roche]. 
19 Mcfetridge & Wong, "Predatory Pricing", supra note 17 at 690. 
20 Ho.ffinan-La Roche, supra note 18 at 34-46. 
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whether Hoffman-La Roche was actually engaged in a policy of selling 
goods,21 the resolution of the case ultimately rested on the definition of 
"unreasonably low" accepted by the court. 
In adopting a definition, Linden J. noted that "economic theory 
cannot control the legal determination of reasonableness, but it is cer-
tainly relevant. "22 This view has support in the literature, where econo-
mists have noted that economic definitions are "not very helpful in 
describing predatory behaviour, and not easily translated into a legal 
rule ... [An economic definition] would be of little value to judges, and 
would offer little guidance to dominant finns as to how to avoid pros-
ecution."23 What was required was an adaptation of economic theory 
into a workable, easily understood legal definition. 
The legal definition resulting from the case is based in part on 
economic theory and in part on what the court believed to be the aims of 
Parliament in enacting the provision. A declaration of the illegality of all 
prices which fell below cost was explicitly rejected. In dismissing the 
definition supported by many economists, most notably Areeda and 
Turner, Linden J. stated that: 
If Parliament had intended that all sales below cost be considered 
unreasonable, it could have defined the term in that way. It did not. 
Parliament used the phrase "unreasonably low", a more flexible provi-
sion, in order to permit the Courts to assess all of the circumstances of 
sales before concluding whether the prices were unreasonably low.24 
Context, therefore, is vital when determining if predation has occurred. 
Four factors were identified as being relevant to the court's analysis. 
The first factor considered was the difference between production 
cost and selling price. The court stated that a price above cost can never 
be unreasonable, and therefore will not be considered predatory. When 
price falls below cost, the greater the disparity between the two will 
increase the likelihood that the price will be viewed as being unreason-
21 The defence argued that because Hoffman-La Roche was not selling valium, but was 
actually giving it away, their actions did not fall within the spectre of the statute. Linden J. 
rejected this view, stating "even when goods are given away totally free by a producer to a 
customer in a commercial context, this is still a "sale" in the sense that word is used in this 
section." (Hoffinan-la Roche, supra note 18 at 37). 
22 Hoffinan-la Roche, supra note 18 at 38. 
23 George A. Hay, "Economics of Predatory Pricing" (1982) 51 Antitrust L.J. 361at362. 
24 Hoffinan-la Roche, supra note 18 at 38. 
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ably low.25 The length of time during which the goods were sold at the 
questionable price was the second relevant factor. The longer the period, 
the more likely that the prices were unreasonably low. Thirdly, the 
reason for the price reduction must be considered. Here, Linden J. 
followed the approach advocated in Producers Dairy: "defensive price-
cutting is viewed differently than offensive price-cutting ... Competition 
is a battle after all, and competitors must be allowed to engage in that 
battle, as long as they do so within reason."26 A price which is set in 
response to a competitor's initial price reduction will be seen as a logical 
reaction in a competitive market, so long as the decrease is propo1iional 
and reasonable. The final factor identified was whether there are any 
long-term benefits to be gained by the price reduction. We must assume 
that the court is talking about only legitimate long-term market benefits, 
given that recoupment after the elimination of rivals is an important 
benefit to a predatory firm and central to a successful predatory pricing 
strategy. 
The court's final area of analysis was with respect to the last element 
of the offence: that the policy of selling at the unreasonably low price 
had the effect or tendency of substantially lessening competition or 
eliminating a rival, or that it was designed to have that effect. The court 
referred to this section as the effect and mens rea analysis. Relying on 
company records to support its finding that the requisite mens rea was 
present in this case, the court nonetheless noted in obiter that the policy 
had not had the desired effect. Linden J. stated that, although the only 
competitor had been persuaded to temporarily exit the market by 
Hoffman-La Roche's actions, this did not necessarily mean that compe-
tition had been substantially lessened, or that the competitor had been 
permanently eliminated.27 This notion is revisited in the Predatory Pric-
ing Guidelines. The current thinking on what constitutes a substantial 
lessening of competition will be discussed in detail below. 
25 Hc!ffinan-La Roche, supra note 18 at 41-2. 
26 Ho.ffinan-La Roche, supra note I 8 at 42. 
27 Hoffinan-La Roche, supra note I 8 at 46. 
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iii. R. v. Consumers Glass Company Ltd. and Portion Packaging. 
The final instalment in the trilogy of predatory pricing cases is R. v. 
Consumers Glass Company Ltd. and Portion Packaging. 28 The main 
issue, like in Hoffman-La Roche, was what constituted "unreasonably 
low" prices within the meaning of s. 34(l)(c) of the Act. In deciding on 
the appropriate pricing theory to adopt, O'Leary J. concentrated specifi-
cally on the Areeda-Tumer test and the Greer test. After hearing the 
testimony of both Dr. Turner and Dr. Greer in defence of their respective 
theories, O'Leary J. articulated the appropriate considerations for the 
specific case before him. He found that, where a market was plagued 
with the chronic overcapacity that was demonstrated in this case, any 
price which was over average variable cost could not be considered 
predatory: 
Dr. Greer assumes that ... there is no predation while the alleged 
predator is loss minimizing in the short run. Dr. Turner is of course of 
the same view ... the accused in this case never sold at predatoty, that is 
to say unreasonably low, prices, because at all times they were selling 
so as to make the greatest contribution to ... [the company's} fixed 
overhead. 29 
While seeming to accept the Areeda-Tumer standard as the default 
position in Canada, O'Leary J. declined to decide which test should be 
generally adopted. It was unnecessary for him to do so for the disposi-
tion of this case - under either test, Portion could not have been found to 
be engaged in predatory behaviour. His interest in Greer's alternative 
test and his extensive comment on the single American case that re-
jected the Areeda-Tumer standard in favour of Greer's (Transamerica 
Computer Co. v. IBM Corp. )30 suggests that he was perhaps leaning in 
that direction. Moreover, after stating that it was unnecessary to choose 
between the two tests, he stated that: 
if! were to adopt the view that any price below average cost is suspect, 
and look to the intent with which that price was adopted, I would still 
conclude that the accused did not adopt such a price in order to lessen 
competition or eliminate Amhil as a competitor but simply to mini-
mize its losses and so the price charged was reasonable. 31 
28 (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (Ont. H.C.J.) [Consumers Glass]. 
29 Ibid. at 297. 
30 (1979), 2 Trade Cases 79, 618. 
31 Consumers Glass, supra note 28 at 300. 
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While the Areeda-Tumer standard had to this point been the de facto test 
applied in Canada, undoubtedly in part due to its wide adoption in other 
jurisdictions, the approach advocated by Greer emphasizing intent and 
market circumstances, was clearly gaining prominence. 
2. The Predatory Pricing Guidelines 
The purpose of the predatory pricing provisions is consistent with the 
purposes of the Act: to protect competition in Canada. In the case of 
predatory pricing, the danger rests in the effects of anticompetitive 
pricing. While low prices seem intuitively like a good thing, in certain 
circumstances they can have a negative impact on both the market and 
consumers. It is these situations where the predatory pricing provisions 
are aimed: "Although such pricing behaviour does confer some benefits 
to the purchasers in the market during the period of predation, those 
benefits will be transitory or short-term, and eventually outweighed by 
increased costs during the period of recoupment."32 
Due largely to the limited case law and the lack of guidance which it 
provided to competitive firms, the Competition Bureau published 
Predatory Pricing Guidelines in 1992. The Guidelines are intended to 
provide the general approach taken to the investigation of predatory 
pricing complaints, but should not been viewed as binding on the 
Bureau, Attorney General, or the courts.33 It is intended to provide some 
guidance so that firms may evaluate the risk that their behaviour will fall 
within the provisions of the Competition Act and thus be criminal. The 
Guidelines recognize that predatory pricing, as defined, will be a rela-
tively rare occurrence. That said, the Competition Commissioner re-
ceives a disproportionately large number of complaints (few of which 
lead to official inquiries, and even less are subsequently referred to the 
Attorney General), and therefore requires a method of assessing com-
plaints in order to "distinguish predatory pricing from otherwise vigor-
ous and desirable price competition."34 As will be seen more clearly 
32 Competition Bureau, Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines (Ottawa: Competition 
Bureau, 1992) at Preface [Competition Bureau, Guidelines]. 
33 Ibid. 
3" Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.1. 
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below, the ability to recoup losses after a period of predation has been 
central to the Canadian approach, and thus consistent with the economic 
rationale underlying the existence of predatory pricing. Absent the 
ability to recoup losses, predatory pricing is irrational behaviour which 
would not be encountered in the market. 
Despite the minimal amount of case law available, the Bureau 
considered those cases that had been decided under the predatory pric-
ing provision when drafting the Guidelines, particularly the Hoffinan-La 
Roche and Consumers Glass cases. The four elements of the offence 
which the Crown must establish are that the predator is "engaged in a 
business"; the prices at issue are "unreasonably low"; those prices must 
be part of a "policy of selling"; and they must have the effect, or be 
designed to have the effect, of "substantially lessening competition or 
eliminating a competitor." That said, the Guidelines make it clear that 
the threshold issue is whether the prices are "unreasonably low."35 
i. "Unreasonably Low" Pricing 
The reasonableness of any price cannot be dete1mined based solely on 
the cost formulas debated by Areeda and Turner, et al. Many of the 
variables recognized by the Bureau as being factors significant to this 
threshold issue are taken from the jurisprudence: 
was the alleged predator responding to price cuts of a rival firm, or did 
the alleged predator initiate them? How long were the prices in effect 
in the market? Was there excess chronic capacity in the industry 
resulting in firms offering prices which could fairly be described as 
loss-minimizing in an effort to remain viable and retain market 
share?36 
With these contextual issues in mind, the analysis into whether the 
prices at issue are unreasonably low is done in two parts. The first step 
considers the market in which the alleged predator does business. At this 
stage of the analysis, market dominance is important. Theoretical analy-
sis of predation demonstrates that the practice is only possible if the 
alleged predator enjoys market dominance. Chicagoans, while dismiss-
35 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part I .4. 
36 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2. 
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ing that predatory pricing could or would occur frequently enough to 
warrant prohibitions, concede that if it were to occur only a dominant 
finn would be in a position to attempt it. As the Guidelines state, "By its 
very nature, price predation presumes that the alleged predator pos-
sesses sufficient market power to unilaterally impose price levels on the 
market long enough to harm its rivals financially, and to recoup any 
losses incurred in the process once its rivals have been forced to exit the 
market."37 To determine market dominance, the Bureau considers the 
concentration of the market. This requires an initial definition of the 
market in which the alleged predator operates, followed by a determina-
tion of that market's concentration: "It is unlikely that an alleged preda-
tor with a market share of less than 35 percent would have the ability to 
unilaterally affect industry pricing."38 With a market share of less than 
35 percent, the alleged predator would be unable to force other competi-
tors to lower their own prices. Moreover, without a rather significant 
difference in size between the alleged predator and alleged victim, the 
victim would be in a position to wait out the predation period. 
The next factor under the market analysis is the conditions of entry. 
This is really an inquiry into whether the alleged predator will be able to 
recoup losses after driving competitors from the market. It is this pre-
condition which Chicagoans believe will make predation an irrational 
strategy, as a firm's ability to recoup was doubted. Likewise, recent 
literature notes that "the recoupment requirement was used to screen out 
cases where predation appeared unprofitable and hence irrational."39 
The Bureau considers factors noted by the academics, including regula-
tions affecting entry into the market and sunk costs, but neglects to 
consider the symmetry between entry and exit barriers. Barriers to entry 
will not only prevent new firms from entering the market, thereby 
allowing the alleged predator to recoup losses from the predation period, 
but will also act as barriers to exit which will dissuade the alleged victim 
from exiting the market in a timely fashion. The disregard for the effect 
of exit barriers may be due to the definition relied on by the Guideline 
with respect to this analysis: 
37 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2.1.1. 
38 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2.1.1. 
39 Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, "Predatory Pricing: Strategic 
Theory and Legal Policy," (2000) 88 Geo. L.J. 2239 at 2263. 
216 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
the Director tries to determine whether or not attempted recoupment 
by the alleged predator, through price increases following the exit of a 
rival or rivals, would, within two years, invite entry into the industry 
on a sufficient scale to ensure that price increases could not be sus-
tained.40 
Thus, because the Commissioner will be looking at whether the predator 
will have more than two years in which to recoup losses incurred during 
the predation period, the effect of barriers to exit will indirectly be taken 
into account. 
The second stage of analysis detennines whether prices were unrea-
sonably low and centres on the relationship between price and cost. The 
Bureau adopts the rationale hinted at in the Consumers Glass case, a 
combination of the Areeda-Turner and Greer rules. Areeda and Turner 
use average marginal cost (substituting average variable cost for the 
sake of convenience) as a litmus to identify prices which are predato1y. 
Likewise, the Bureau will view a price which is below the average 
variable cost as unreasonably low, unless there is a justification for such 
a low price.41 Greer, on the other hand, advocates a finding of predation 
where costs are below the firm's average total costs. The Guidelines 
state that no price above a finn's average total cost will be regarded as 
unreasonably low.42 Thus, prices which are above average variable cost 
but below average total cost fall within a grey area in Canada. Whether 
prices within this grey range will be viewed as unreasonably low will 
depend on the circumstances. The Guidelines note that declining de-
mand or substantial excess capacity in the market may justify prices 
within this range.43 
An additional element is required under the Canadian test: the policy 
of selling at the unreasonably low price must have the effect or the 
tendency to substantially lessen competition or eliminate a competitor, 
or be designed to have that effect. Thus the Canadian test allows for 
defences even after a finding that prices are unreasonably low: that the 
pricing behaviour did not have the effect required, and that there was no 
predatory intent. Again, the Guidelines seem to favour the Greer ap-
proach as opposed to that of Areeda and Turner, who explicitly reject 
4° Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2. I .2. 
41 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2.2. 
42 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2.2. 
43 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.2.2. 
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any defences once it is established that the pnce is below average 
variable cost.44 
Once it has been established that the prices of an alleged predator are 
unreasonably low, and that there is a policy of selling goods at this 
unreasonably low price,45 the analysis turns to their purpose and effect. 
ii. Competitive Impact 
Paragraph 50(1 )( c) of the Competition Act makes it clear that either an 
anticompetitive effect or an anticompetitive purpose will lead to a 
finding that a firm has engaged in predatory behaviour, where the other 
elements of the offence have been satisfied. Accordingly, the statute is 
concerned with three scenarios, only one of which must be established 
for a conviction: "circumstances where the objectionable pricing 
behaviour has already brought about demonstrable and measurable 
harmful economic effects", circumstances "where the objectionable 
pricing behaviour has not been in place for a period of time sufficient to 
yet fully bring about these effects," and circumstances where "there is 
evidence available with respect to harmful design or intent of the alleged 
predator. "46 
There are actually five elements within the competitive impact 
analysis: whether a substantial lessening of competition has occurred; 
whether the elimination of a competitor has occurred; whether the 
behaviour would have a tendency to substantially lessen competition; 
whether the behaviour would have a tendency to eliminate a competitor; 
and whether there is evidence that, even if unsuccessful, the alleged 
predator cut prices with the intention of substantially lessening competi-
tion or eliminating a competitor.47 
44 Although, Areeda and Turner only directly consider the defences of promotional pricing and 
meeting the competition. See Areeda & Turner, "Predatory Pricing", supra note 6 at 715. 
45 Factors relevant to the determination of whether there is a "policy of selling" include 
whether the prices were in place for a short period of time, whether they are defensive 
reactions to the pricing initiatives of competitor firms, and whether they are the response to 
various random market occurrences. See Competition Bureau, "Guidelines", supra note 32 at 
Part 2.3 
46 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.4. 
47 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.4. 
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The relevant inquiry to detennine whether a substantial lessening of 
competition has occurred is whether the pricing policy had the effect or 
tendency to "preserve or add to market power and that there is little 
opportunity for competition in the future because entry barriers are 
maintained or raised."48 It is significant that the preservation of market 
power is included in this definition. In Hoffman-La Roche, Linden J. 
indicated that it was unlikely that the Crown could prove a substantial 
lessening of competition, given that only one competitor was forced to 
stop competing in the relevant market. Although competition was less-
ened to a certain degree, he felt this did not necessarily equal a substan-
tial lessening of competition.49 The Guidelines indicate that this reason-
ing would not be upheld if that situation were to arise again. Hoffman-
La Roche was clearly attempting to preserve its market share, conse-
quently preventing any new entrants into that particular market. The 
effect of predatory behaviour in a situation such as this is to create a 
barrier to entry. 
The elements dealing with the elimination of a competitor are 
straightforward. The analysis will consider whether the competitor has 
left the market permanently. For this to be established, the Director must 
be satisfied that the firm has gone out of business, or is no longer in a 
position to prevent the alleged predator from raising prices to an 
anticompetitive level.50 On this issue, the Guidelines are in agreement 
with the decision in Hoffman-La Roche. There, Linden J. stated that the 
Crown could not establish that the alleged predatory behaviour had 
actually eliminated the rival from the market permanently. The firm had 
continued to sell small amounts within the relevant market, and 
Hoffman-La Roche was not in a position to sell at monopoly-level 
prices. 51 
The final method of satisfying the competitive impact analysis is 
with respect to the intent, or mens rea, of the alleged predator. The 
Guidelines note that a number of factors are relevant to this determina-
tion, including the magnitude of the price cuts and the losses incurred, 
the lack of any justifying reason for the price cuts, and any documents or 
48 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.4. 
49 H14finan-la Roche, supra note 18 at 47. 
5° Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.4. 
51 Ho.ffinan-la Roche, supra note 18 at 4 7. 
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oral evidence establishing an anticompetitive intent.52 As advocated by 
Greer, any extrinsic evidence will be relevant to the final determination. 
iii. Proposed Amendments 
In March of 2002, the Competition Bureau released a draft of the 
proposed Enforcement Guidelines on Illegal Trade Practices: Unreason-
ably Low Pricing Policies. These Guidelines, when adopted, will re-
place the Predatory Pricing Guidelines discussed above.53 According to 
the draft Guidelines, their intention is to update the approach taken by 
the Bureau in accordance with changing economic perspectives. Under-
lying the proposed Guidelines is an increased awareness of strategic 
predation, and analysis on this issue has been added throughout the 
document. More specifically, there are three main changes from the 
existing Predatory Pricing Guidelines: the significance of the ability to 
recoup losses, the measure used in the price-cost analysis, and new 
guidelines dealing with unreasonably low pricing resulting from market 
expansion.54 Only the first two are relevant to the current analysis. 
The ability of an alleged predator to recoup losses has always been 
significant to the predatory pricing inquiry. Without this, the practice of 
predatory pricing is irrational, and would not be engaged in. Where 
recoupment was a threshold issue under the Predatory Pricing Guide-
lines, it is now considered only in relation to the competitive impacts 
analysis. The ability to recoup losses is seen as an indication of market 
share and barriers to entry and exit, but is "not a necessary element to be 
proven under paragraph ... 50(1)(c)."55 The relegation of recoupment 
from a threshold issue to a position of one of many factors contradicts 
the theoretical arguments which consider it as central to the analysis of 
classic predation. The proposed Guidelines, however, note a number of 
situations in which predation could occur for reasons other than to 
ensure future recoupment: 
52 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 2.4. 
53 Competition Bureau, News Release, "Information" (8 March, 2002) <http:// 
strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ct0234 I e.html>. 
54 Competition Bureau, J/legal Trade Practices: Unreasonably Low Pricing Policies (Draft), 
on line: <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/I /ctO l l 39e.html> [Competition Bureau, Illegal Trade 
Practices]. 
55 Ibid. at 14. 
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... it may be rational for a firm to adopt a low-pricing policy and 
sacrifice present profits in order to preserve the long-term stability of 
an existing market structure. Additionally, a low-pricing policy could 
assist in establishing an industry standard to exclude others or main-
tain market control.56 
Implicit in this reasoning is the threat of strategic predation. A firm may 
engage in predatory pricing, not to ensure monopoly-level prices in the 
future, but to ensure that market share (and consequently profit) is not 
eroded in the future. They will not recoup their short-term losses per se, 
but future profits will be protected. In that sense, recoupment does 
actually occur, in that absent the predatory behaviour, the firm would 
likely have seen a future decline in profits. 
The second significant change to the existing Guidelines is with 
respect to the measure used to determine which prices are "unreason-
ably low." In place of average variable cost and average total cost, the 
Bureau now recognizes avoidable cost as the appropriate measure. 
A voidable costs are defined as "all costs that could have been avoided 
by a firm had it chosen not to sell the product(s) in question. In general, 
avoidable costs do not include sunk costs."57 It would seem that avoid-
able costs include some fixed costs, such as the price and maintenance 
of machinery, which are not included in average variable cost. The 
difficulty with using this measure arises when courts are unable to 
obtain all the information necessary to calculate avoidable cost. This 
concern is especially relevant if the firm is engaged in the production of 
multiple products. If the courts face this difficulty, expedience will 
likely dictate that they use a proxy for avoidable costs, and revert back 
to using average variable cost and average total costs. 
3. Abuse of Dominance Provisions 
The above discussion concerns the criminal prov1s10ns dealing with 
predatory pricing. This type of anticompetitive behaviour can also be 
dealt with under the abuse of dominance provisions found in paragraph 
79 of the Act. As a non-criminal provision, the Commissioner of 
56 Competition Bureau, 11/ega/ Trade Practices, supra note 54 at 14. 
57 Competition Bureau, 11/ega/ Trade Practices, supra note 54 at 16. 
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Competition can make an application for a remedial order from the 
Competition Tribunal. Upon receiving an application and being satis-
fied that the elements of the offence have been established, the Tribunal 
is empowered to impose a variety of remedies. In most cases, the 
Commissioner will decide at the outset which provision is the most 
appropriate venue given the circumstances of the particular case. 
Behaviour reviewable under paragraph 79 is very similar to that 
which is criminal under paragraph 50. The Abuse of Dominance Guide-
lines state that: 
an abuse occurs when a dominant firm or group of firms engages in 
conduct that constitutes exclusionary, disciplinary or predatory 
behaviour towards competitors or potential competitors, with the re-
sult that competition is prevented or lessened substantially.58 
The elements to be established under this provision are closely related to 
those examined with respect to paragraph 50(1 )( c ). Likewise, the stated 
purpose of the Abuse of Dominance provisions is to ensure that effec-
tive competition is allowed to flourish, and not be impeded by 
anticompetitive acts of a dominant firm. 59 
There are three elements contained within paragraph 79. These will 
not be examined in detail, except to the extent that they parallel those 
found in paragraph 50. As its name suggests, central to the Abuse of 
Dominance provisions is an examination of the market power that is, 
the dominance of the finn within the particular market. As is the case 
with respect to a predatory pricing analysis, this entails an examination 
into existing barriers to entry and the market share enjoyed by a firm. 
The market share should be greater than thirty-five percent in order for 
the Bureau to continue its investigation; market shares below that level 
are not considered "dominant."60 
The anticompetitive acts complained of must be the "practice" of the 
dominant firm. This is similar to the "policy" of selling at an unreason-
ably low cost analysis that is undertaken pursuant to paragraph 50( I)( c ). 
The Guidelines indicate that the definition of "practice" is broader than 
that of "policy": "while a practice is normally more than an isolated act, 
58 Competition Bureau, Enforcement Guidelines on the Abuse of Dominance Provisions 
(Ottawa: Competition Bureau, 2001) at 6 [Competition Bureau, Enforcement Guidelines]. 
59 Ibid. at 6. 
6° Competition Bureau, Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 58 at 15. 
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it may also constitute one occurrence that is sustained and systemic or 
that has had a lasting impact on the state of competition."61 Given the 
wide variety of acts covered by this provision, it is foreseeable that a 
single act may have long tenn effects on competition, unlike predatory 
pricing where unreasonably low price levels would have no significant 
impact on competition where they were not prolonged. 
The final element under paragraph 79 is the effect of preventing or 
lessening competition substantially in a market. As under paragraph 50, 
the substantial lessening of competition occurs when a dominant finn 
"preserve[ s] or add[ s] to ... [their] market power. "62 
Paragraph 79, therefore, provides an alternative avenue. Which the 
Commissioner chooses will depend on circumstances specific to the 
case and may include whether the firm has engaged in other 
anticompetitive activities or if a more effective remedy may be available 
under paragraph 79. 63 A remedy to correct the anticompetitive 
behaviour in an expedient manner may be preferable to a criminal action 
which would undoubtedly take longer to resolve. An especially impor-
tant consideration is the strength of the Commissioner's evidence that 
predation has occurred. Because paragraph 50 is a criminal provision, 
its elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt - a burden that 
has been difficult to meet in many past antitrust prosecutions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Predato1y pricing is perhaps one of the most debated issues in antitrust 
economics. Its very existence has been disputed, and there is currently 
no universal agreement on how to recognize it. That said, the past thirty 
years have been witness to significant advances in its understanding. 
Courts and tribunals have begun to utilize current economic thinking to 
develop a legal standard that is inclusive enough to catch predatory 
behaviour, but cautious enough to not impede effective competition. 
Chicagoans objected to the regulation of predatory pricing because they 
61 Competition Bureau, E11j(1rce111e11t Guidelines, supra note 58 at 17. 
62 Competition Bureau, Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 58 at 18. 
63 Competition Bureau, Guidelines, supra note 32 at Part 1.2. 
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believed the process for identifying it would lead to the 
misidentification of legitimate forms of competition. Time has shown 
that, not only can predatory behaviour happen in an ever more concen-
trated marketplace, it can be distinguished from beneficial competition. 
Canadian experience provides ample evidence of this. From the hun-
dreds of allegations of predatory pricing, only three cases have pro-
gressed to the courts, and of those only one has resulted in a conviction. 
This is likely due in part to the alternate civil avenue made available 
through paragraph 79 of the Act. But much credit must be given to the 
Bureau and to the courts. The ultimate purpose behind prohibiting 
predation - to ensure fair competition among all firms - has not been 
lost. 
Given the results arising from an inquiry into the Canadian experi-
ence, it is safe to conclude that the prohibition of predatory pricing is 
warranted. Antitrust legislation which purports to protect the competi-
tive process and consumer welfare cannot ignore a practice that has 
proven to be a threat to these ideals. 
